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Abstract 
Psychologists have typically defined obedience as a form of social influence elicited in 
response to direct orders from an authority figure.  In the most influential set of studies of 
obedience, conducted by Stanley Milgram in the early 1960s, the orders at the disposal of the 
authority figure were a series of verbal prods.  However, recent research has suggested that 
Milgram’s experiments do not show people following orders.  It has therefore been suggested 
that the experiments are not demonstrations of obedience.  However, in the present paper it is 
argued that rather than abandoning the idea that Milgram’s work is a demonstration of 
obedience, it is in fact our conceptualisation of obedience that is wrong.  Obedience should 
not be understood as requiring direct orders from an authority figure.  This argument is 
developed with reference to an extended case example from one of Milgram’s experimental 
conditions in which a participant completed the experiment in the absence of direct orders.  It 
is argued that such participants can still be understood as obedient if we consider the implicit 
demands of the system in which participants find themselves. The paper concludes by 
presenting a new definition of obedience that omits the need for direct orders. 
 Keywords:  authority, obedience, rhetoric, social influence  
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Obedience without orders:  Expanding social psychology’s conception of ‘obedience’. 
 
Milgram’s (1963, 1965a, 1974) experiments on obedience to authority continue to be 
widely cited both within and beyond social psychology (Miller, 2016).  Scholars in fields 
such as law, business, history, sociology and criminology have drawn lessons from them to 
apply to the problems of their own fields, and they have been the subject of numerous 
documentaries and creative works, including a recent Hollywood biopic of Milgram, 
Experimenter, that focussed heavily on the obedience experiments.  A conventional view of 
the experiments has crystallised which sees them as a demonstration of a tendency towards 
passive obedience in the face of an authority figure (Griggs, 2017; Griggs & Whitehead, 
2015a, b). 
However, recently there has been a sustained challenge to this image of the 
experiments as a new wave of theoretical, methodological and ethical criticism has been 
developed (e.g. Brannigan, Nicholson & Cherry, 2015; Gibson, 2013a, b; Haslam & Reicher, 
2017; Nicholson, 2011; Perry, 2012, 2013; Russell, 2011).  Of particular note, some of this 
work has challenged the extent to which Milgram’s (1963, 1965a, 1974) studies of 
destructive obedience can properly be said to have shown people obeying orders (e.g. Burger, 
Girgis & Manning, 2011; Gibson, 2013a; Haslam & Reicher, 2017).  As a result, it has been 
suggested that the experiments are not about obedience at all.  In this conceptual paper, I 
suggest that, attractive though this line of argument is, it neglects the wider issue of how 
obedience itself is to be understood.  Specifically, I will argue that the definition of obedience 
typically used in social psychology – as a form of social influence elicited in response to 
direct orders/commands – is too limited.  Through an illustrative consideration of a case 
example of one of Milgram’s experimental sessions, I will suggest that we should conceive of 
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obedience as a function of more diffuse processes of authority, and will propose a new 
definition of obedience which removes the need for an order/command. 
 In doing so, my conceptual analysis touches on issues concerning the appropriate 
description of action.  The question of the extent to which the focus on participant 
descriptions of action either should, or ever possibly could, replace the more conventional 
social scientific preoccupation with arriving at satisfactory analysts’ definitions, has been a 
feature of debate for some time (e.g. Billig, 1999a; Schegloff, 1997, 1999; Wetherell, 1998).  
As yet, these issues have yet to be considered in relation to obedience, and in seeking to 
provide a new definition of obedience I am explicitly moving from a concern with 
participants’ own descriptions to a concern with the appropriate way in which, as analysts, we 
might make sense of the phenomena captured in Milgram’s lab.  As my argument develops, I 
will highlight areas in which we might exercise more caution in the way in which we draw 
inferences as analysts (e.g. in relation to the referentiality of participants’ talk), but I will 
suggest that it is nevertheless useful to work towards a revised analysts’ definition of 
obedience itself.  This should not, of course, be taken either as a suggestion that analyst 
definitions should be the sole focus of attention, nor as an indication that attempts to explore 
how ‘obedience’ can function as a participants’ resources are ruled out (and see Gibson, 
Blenkinsopp, Johnstone & Marshall, 2018, for just such an attempt). 
 
Defining obedience: the role of the order/command 
The standard social psychological definition of obedience is well-established and 
continues to be widely used.  For example, it can be found in textbooks, such as Kassin, Fein 
and Markus’s (2017, p. 292) most recent edition of their popular introductory social 
psychology text, in which obedience is defined as, ‘Behavior change produced by the 
commands of authority’.  This is no mere simplification for a novice audience; in a recent 
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handbook chapter providing a review of research on obedience, Burger (2015, p. 1) opens by 
stating that ‘Obedience researchers are interested in how individuals respond to orders or 
demands from a person or institution in a position of authority.’ 
 It is therefore clear that the social act of the order or command is central to 
conceptions of obedience in social psychology, and yet few researchers have sought to 
explicitly define these terms1.  A notable exception to this can be found in the most 
influential contribution to the study of obedience, and yet rather than providing a resolution 
this in fact opens up further problems that have, to date, received scant attention in the 
literature.  Milgram (1974) defined command as follows: 
 
‘A command consists of two main parts:  a definition of action and the imperative that 
the action be executed.  (A request, for example, contains a definition of action but 
lacks the insistence that it be carried out.)’ 
(Milgram, 1974, pp. 147-8). 
However, a number of authors have noted that when we examine Milgram’s procedure it is 
actually rather difficult to identify examples of commands (Burger, Girgis & Manning, 2011; 
Reicher & Haslam, 2011).  Most of Milgram’s (1963, 1965a, 1974) experimental conditions 
required participants to administer what they thought were potentially dangerous electric 
shocks to someone who they believed to be a fellow naïve participant, but who was in fact a 
confederate.  The shocks were administered as punishments for incorrect answers on a 
memory task.  If participants hesitated, or refused to continue, the experimenter running the 
session could use a series of verbal prods in order to elicit obedience.  The prods, described 
by Miller (2009, p. 25) as ‘one of the most important features of the obedience paradigm … 
[and] the most explicit operationalization of authority’, were as follows: 
Prod 1:  Please continue, or, Please go on. 
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Prod 2:  The experiment requires that you continue. 
Prod 3:  It is absolutely essential that you continue. 
Prod 4:  You have no other choice, you must go on. 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 21, italics in original) 
In addition, the experimenter could use two ‘special prods’ more flexibly as required by the 
situation.  If the participant expressed concern for the potential harm to the learner, the 
experimenter could respond with, ‘Although the shocks may be painful, there is no 
permanent tissue damage, so please go on’ (Milgram, 1974, p. 21).  If the participant drew 
attention to the learner’s apparent lack of willingness to continue, he could say, ‘Whether the 
learner likes it or not, you must go on until he has learned all the word pairs correctly.  So 
please go on’ (Milgram, 1974, p. 22). 
Given his own definition of command it is perhaps surprising that Milgram did not 
treat at least some of his prods as requests rather than commands.  In particular, prod 1, 
‘Please continue’ or ‘Please go on’, appears to meet Milgram’s own definition of a request 
(insofar as it lacks insistence) rather than his definition of a command.  We might, of course, 
suggest that Milgram’s definition is unsatisfactory and that even a phrase such as ‘please 
continue’ should be counted as a command, albeit a softened one, when issued by an 
authority figure in a context over which they have jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, it has recently 
been argued that only one of Milgram’s prods – the fourth one – resembles an actual order 
(Burger, Girgis & Manning, 2011; Reicher & Haslam, 2011) in that it is predicated on the 
straightforward removal of choice without any rationale.  Describing prod 4, Miller (2009, p. 
25), has argued that, ‘[t]aken literally and out of context, these words are clearly 
preposterous.  They violate any reasonable sense of ethics.  In context, of course, they appear 
to have had considerable persuasive force’.  However, until recently there had been no 
attempt to determine whether this ‘considerable persuasive force’ was more than merely 
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apparent.  This led Reicher and Haslam (2011, p. 167) to argue that ‘The question of whether 
or not people obey this fourth prompt is decisive in establishing the validity of those 
interpretations of Milgram’s studies that see them as a demonstration of how people follow 
orders.’  It is notable, therefore, that three lines of recent convergent evidence from 
researchers adopting quite different theoretical perspectives points to the ineffectiveness of 
the fourth prod. 
First, Gibson (2013a) has explored the extent to which participants in two of 
Milgram’s experimental conditions actually obeyed the fourth prod.  Of the 23 participants on 
whom prod four was used, it elicited further shocks from only two, and only one of these 
subsequently went to the maximum 450-volt level on the shock generator.  In Milgram’s own 
experiments, therefore, it appears that the prod that most closely resembles an order is 
actually rather easy for participants to resist. 
Second, Burger et al (2011) explored the extent to which participants in a partial 
replication (Burger, 2009) of the Milgram paradigm continued with the experiment after 
receiving each of the prods.  They found that no participants continued after having received 
the fourth prod, findings which they argued ‘question the assumption that participants in the 
obedience studies continued with the procedure because they were obeying orders’ (Burger et 
al, 2011, p. 464-5).  However, Burger et al also noted a major confound concerning the 
ordering of the prods.  Essentially, because the prods were always used in the same order, it 
may simply be that participants have already become committed to resisting the experimenter 
by the time the fourth prod is delivered, and that had the fourth prod been delivered first it 
would have elicited greater levels of obedience. 
Third, Haslam, Reicher and Birney (2014) addressed this potential confound through 
a novel experimental analogue of the Milgram paradigm.  Haslam et al’s procedure involved 
participants having to select from a list of negative words to describe a range of images which 
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depicted groups of people.  At first the groups depicted were clearly unpleasant (e.g. the Ku 
Klux Klan; Nazis) and thus rating them negatively did not present a problem for participants.  
However, as the experiment went on the groups became progressively less unpleasant, 
culminating in scenes of children and happy family groups.  The terms participants were 
required to ascribe to the groups thus became increasingly incongruous as the experiment 
went on.  In order to test participants’ reactions to Milgram’s four sequential prods, 
participants were divided into four conditions.  Each condition was shown one of the prods 
between each trial.  Haslam et al found that participants receiving the second prod (‘The 
experiment requires that you continue’) were the most likely to complete the study, most 
likely to complete a post-experimental questionnaire, and had the highest mean termination 
point.  On the latter two measures, continuation in the group receiving prod 4 (‘You have no 
other choice…’) was significantly lower.  Haslam et al interpreted this as evidence that 
appeals to science (‘The experiment requires…’) were most successful in eliciting 
continuation, and that direct orders were not particularly successful. 
Taken together, these studies point to the conclusion that participants in Milgram’s 
studies were not following orders.  Insofar as obedience has typically been defined in terms 
of following orders, this suggests that the phenomenon captured in Milgram’s experiments 
should not be understood in terms of obedience.  However, such a suggestion presupposes 
that the standard definition of obedience used in psychology is adequate.  In this paper, I want 
to argue that this definition has never been adequate, and that a new definition is required that 
avoids the conflation of obedience and orders.  It should be made clear, however, that a new 
definition of obedience it is not needed simply to tidy up some minor terminological issue, 
but rather that the uncoupling of obedience and orders is vital if the present state of 
conceptual confusion is to be clarified. 
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Theorising obedience 
 Despite the continuing fascination with Milgram’s experiments, they have resisted 
adequate theoretical conceptualisation.  Milgram’s (1974) own agentic state theory is 
generally regarded as weak even by authors who are typically favourably disposed towards 
Milgram and his work (e.g. Blass, 2004; Miller, 1986).  Indeed, in summarising the state of 
theoretical discussion on the obedience experiments, Miller (2009, p. 21) has argued that, 
‘Plausible ideas here are rampant, but somewhat vague and always numerous.’  
Recently however, Haslam and Reicher (2017; Reicher & Haslam, 2011) have drawn 
on the social identity perspective (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) to develop an explanation based on the concept of ‘engaged 
followership’.  They argue that participants did not obey the experimenter’s orders, but rather 
that they were faced with a situation in which there were two competing sources of social 
identity.  Participants could identify with the experimenter, and the wider scientific 
community which he represented, or with the learner, and the broader (moral) community of 
ordinary people which he represented.  When participants continued administering the 
electric shocks, it was not therefore a result of blind obedience, but rather because they 
identified with the experimenter’s scientific project, and they made a decision to follow him.  
Haslam and Reicher have developed novel empirical paradigms which have begun to 
generate supporting evidence for this explanation (Haslam et al., 2014; Haslam, Reicher & 
Millard, 2015; Haslam, Reicher, Millard & McDonald, 2015; Reicher, Haslam & Smith, 
2012), and the approach is attractive insofar as it connects Milgram’s experiments with a 
wider analysis of power and social influence (Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2011; Turner, 
1991, 2005), and in that it places the emphasis as much on defiance and resistance as on 
obedience.  However, it has also been challenged on the grounds that it effectively seeks to 
replace Milgram’s over-simplistic agentic state explanation with another one-size-fits-all 
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explanation which oversimplifies the complex behaviour captured in Milgram’s paradigm.  
Hollander and Turowetz (2017) use evidence from Milgram’s post-experiment interviews to 
highlight the relative absence of accounts that might be understood as indicative of engaged 
followership, and argue that the aim of producing a single explanation for all behaviour in the 
Milgram experiments may be unrealistic.  Instead they advocate a composite approach that 
recognises the likelihood that multiple processes are in operation. 
 However, while Hollander and Turowetz’s (2017) cautions against premature 
theoretical closure are important2, their analysis is itself problematic in that it uses participant 
utterances generated on one context (i.e. the post-experiment interviews) as resources through 
which to explain participant behaviour in another context (i.e. the experimental sessions 
themselves).  From a discursive psychological perspective, it can therefore be understood as 
an example of selective reification (Potter, 1996), whereby rather than treating all accounts as 
oriented to performing particular functions in the specific context of their production, the 
analyst applies this perspective only to certain accounts, whilst choosing simply to take other 
accounts at face value.  In contrast, we might understand Milgram’s post-experiment 
interviews not in terms of what they can tell us about what participants were ‘really thinking’ 
during the experimental sessions, but as specific contexts themselves, in which participants 
were engaged in specific interactional projects.  For obedient participants, this entailed 
providing accounts for why they had continued to administer electric shocks to the protesting 
learner (Gibson et al., 2018; Haslam & Reicher, 2018).  While Hollander and Turowetz 
(2017) suggest (albeit cautiously) that there are good reasons to take participants’ accounts as 
indicative of underlying psychological processes, this in effect contradicts the 
epistemological principles of the ethnomethodological/conversation analytic position that 
they adopt.  Whilst the relationship between accounts and cognition (understood as 
underlying process) has been the subject of debate (e.g. Drew, 2005; Potter, 2006), analysts 
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in these traditions typically signal a concern for members’ methods over analyst-driven 
conclusions about the truth or falsity of accounts.  The key issue is thus not to take an 
analysts’ position on whether participant accounts are – to use Hollander and Turowetz’s 
terms – either candid or self-exculpatory – but rather to treat all such utterances as situated 
social actions without taking a position on the ultimate referentiality of such talk.   
 We therefore need to broaden our conceptual frameworks for understanding 
obedience in a way that connects them with broader analyses of power and authority while 
retaining an appreciation of the complexity of behaviours within the Milgram experiment, but 
which does so without losing the sensitivity to the contextual contingencies of Milgram’s 
paradigm.  Foucault’s (1979) seminal analysis of the operation of disciplinary power in 
modern societies provides one lens through which to re-orient our understanding of 
Milgram’s studies.  In treating obedience as synonymous with following orders, social 
psychologists have neglected the more subtle ways in which authority operates, and in which 
obedience is enacted.  Following Foucault, we might suggest that there would be no reason to 
expect power to be exercised through the issuing of direct commands, but rather through the 
operations of more subtle techniques of control and domination which ultimately come to 
work on the shaping of individual subjects themselves.  However, Foucault’s perspective is 
less concerned with the details of language-in-use than with the tectonic movements of wider 
discursive patterns, and in this respect places individuals as being at the mercy of forces 
beyond their control (e.g. Potter, 1996).  For this reason, the conceptual analysis outlined in 
the present paper will go beyond Foucault to draw on Billig’s (1995, 1996, 1999b) rhetorical 
perspective, which has the crucial advantage of enabling us to retain the concern with 
resistance as much as with domination. 
 
Rhetoric and defiance 
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Much of the recent re-evaluation of Milgram’s work can be summarized as suggesting 
that when the experimenter issued orders, participants found them fairly easy to resist.   Allied 
to this is the observation that the experimenter frequently departed from the standardized 
form of the prods in ways that rendered his interventions more akin to persuasive rhetoric 
than the exercising of blunt authority (Gibson, 2013a, b).  Secondary analysis of Milgram’s 
studies has thus drawn attention to the levels of resistance and argumentation in the 
experiments (Gibson, 2013a, 2014, 2017; Hoffman, Myerberg & Morawski, 2015; Hollander, 
2015; Hollander & Maynard, 2016), and has found that there are regularities in the timing of 
participants’ attempts at defiance (Packer, 2008).  Moreover, across all experimental 
conditions defiance was more common than obedience (N. Haslam, Loughnan & Perry, 
2014).  This work has provided an important corrective to the received view of Milgram’s 
studies presented in textbook accounts, which typically de-emphasise resistance in favour of 
an account focussed on passive obedience (Griggs, 2017; Griggs & Whitehead, 2015a, b). 
However, if this work has shown that disobeying explicit orders thus appears to be 
much more straightforward than the standard treatment of Milgram’s studies would suggest, 
the corollary of this is that those participants who went all the way on the shock generator did 
so without having to obey direct orders.  Whatever was keeping them in the experiment, it 
was not the social act of an order or command as defined by Milgram, or as assumed by 
generations of textbook writers.  Indeed, this brings us back to a consideration of how 
experimental sessions unfolded when participants completed the procedure all the way to the 
maximum shock level.  One iconic representation of such a participant can be found in 
Milgram’s (1965b) own documentary film of his experiments.  The film focuses at most 
length on one individual – pseudonymized by Milgram (1974) as Fred Prozi – who is shown 
repeatedly questioning and resisting the experimenter, but who nevertheless continues with 
the experiment all the way to the end of the scale.  This has been used to suggest that the 
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levels of resistance – even amongst ‘obedient’ participants – was apparent all along, hidden 
in plain sight, but obscured by the standard account of passive participants fulfilling their role 
as functionaries in Milgram’s chain of command. 
 However, the availability of audio recordings of most of Milgram’s experimental 
sessions in the archives at Yale University means that the extent to which ‘obedient’ 
participants actually engaged in resistance can be assessed.  In an early study, Modigliani and 
Rochat (1995) found that defiant participants initiated resistance earlier in the procedure than 
obedient participants, and more recently Hollander (2015; Hollander & Maynard, 2016) has 
identified systematic differences in interactional strategies employed by defiant and obedient 
participants, and has drawn attention to the sequential organisation of participant resistance.  
Drawing on the conversation analytic concept of the directive, Hollander (2015) has 
identified a common interactional pattern whereby a directive from the experimenter is 
responded to by resistance from participants, which then elicits a further directive from the 
experimenter.  Participants could then either upgrade their resistance in order to hasten their 
exit from the experiment, or yield to the directive and keep administering the shocks. 
There is still much work to be done on this issue, but these studies point to the 
preliminary conclusion that some participants simply resisted earlier and to greater effect than 
others.  It is therefore necessary – without seeking to reinstate the standard view of Milgram’s 
participants as passive automata simply acting as agents of an authority’s commands – to re-
visit the studies in an attempt to explore how Milgram’s situation kept a sizeable number of 
participants administering shocks to an innocent victim.  To do this, I will consider a single 
case from Milgram’s experiments – not in an attempt to suggest that this can be used to 
generalize to the experiments as a whole – but rather to explore a particularly non-resistant 
participant in what would appear to be an experimental condition in which resistance was the 
norm rather than the exception.  Such a participant constitutes an ideal case with which to 
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explore the nature of ‘obedience’ in the experiments given that the par ticipant continues with 
the experiment despite the fact that no direct orders are issued.  However, it constitutes a 
‘hard case’ for perspectives emphasising the rhetorical nature of the experiments insofar as it 
appears that argumentation is completely absent.  It will be suggested, however, that 
consideration of this case points the way both to an expanded definition of obedience, and an 
expanded conception of the role of rhetoric in Milgram’s experimental procedure.  
 
Obedience without orders:  An extended case example 
The example used is taken from a participant in condition 4 of the experiments, 
known as the touch-proximity condition (Milgram, 1965a, 1974).  This condition was part of 
the ‘proximity’ series of experiments, which varied the physical and psychological proximity 
of the victim to the participant.  Unlike in many other of Milgram’s conditions, in which the 
learner was in a different room to the teacher, in the touch-proximity condition the learner 
and teacher were in the same room.  Moreover, once the learner had withdrawn consent at the 
150-volt shock level, the participant had to physically manoeuvre the learner’s hand onto a 
shock plate in order for the electric shock to be administered.  As a result, the condition is 
typically seen as requiring much greater involvement on the part of the naïve participant than 
other experimental conditions.  Accordingly, the obedience rate of 30% (12 out of 40 
participants) was lower compared with other conditions in the proximity series, such as when 
the learner was in an adjoining room (conditions 1 & 2; 65% & 62.5% obedience 
respectively), or when no physical contact was required to administer the shock (condition 3; 
40% obedience).  And yet it is possible to find participants in condition 4 who completed the 
experiment with minimal resistance.  The case selected for extended analysis here has thus 
been chosen precisely because it features a participant who at no point attempts any obvious 
resistance to the experimenter.  The audio recording of this experimental session (labelled 
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session 0427 in the archival records) was accessed in the Stanley Milgram Papers archive at 
Yale University, where it is held along with hundreds of others from the experiments, 
including a total of 27 from the touch-proximity condition.  The recording was transcribed by 
the author.  Although focussing on a single experimental session for illustrative purposes, this 
case forms part of a wider analytic project focussing on secondary qualitative analysis of the 
audio recordings from the obedience experiments that has drawn on the tools of discursive 
and rhetorical psychology (Gibson, 2013a, b, 2014, 2017; Gibson, Blenknisopp, Johnstone & 
Marshall, 2018). 
In the extracts that follow, speakers are identified as T (teacher; the naïve participant), 
L (learner) and E (experimenter); other transcription conventions are summarised in the 
Appendix.  We join the experiment as the participant, who has progressed through the test 
swiftly and with no obvious response to the learner’s apparently increasing discomfort, is 
about to administer the 150v shock: 
 
Extract 1 
1 T: Wrong.  One fifty volts. 
2  ((SHOCK)) 
3 L: OW! 
4 T: White, horse. 
5 L: Experimenter I don’t want 
6  to go along with this any 
7  more.  I er refuse to go on 
8  any more I don’t want the 
9  shocks. 
10 E: Relax and try and 
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11  concentrate on what the 
12  teacher is saying. 
13 L: I’m not gonna touch that 
14  plate any more.  I don’t 
15  want these shocks 
16  [any more.] 
17 E: [Teacher], please 
18  continue. 
19 T: Sad, face, music, clown, 
20  girl. 
21  ((CLICK))3 
22 T: Correct.  Short, sentence, 
23  movie, skirt, time. 
24  ((CLICK)) 
25 T: Wrong.  One sixty five 
26  volts. 
27  ((CLICK)) 
28 E: Er 
29 T: Put the pla- 
30 E: Learner you must er, 
31  depress the plate 
32  [in order to re-] 
33 L: [I’m not touch]ing that 
34  plate any more I don’t 
35  want these shocks any 
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36  more. 
37 E: Y- you must depress the 
38  plate in order to receive 
39  the punishment. 
40 L: I’m not part of this 
41  experiment any more I 
42  don’t want any more 
43  shocks.  I’m not touching 
44  the plate. 
45  (2) 
46 E: Teacher, er you’ll just, er 
47  have to reach over and 
48  push his hand down onto 
49  the plate [please.] 
50 L:    [naw] I don’t 
51  want any more. 
52 E: And then administer the 
53  punishment when you 
54  have his hand down onto 
55  the plate.  Please continue 
56  teacher. [Administ-] 
57 T:   [Do the same] one 
58  over? 
59 E: Er, er yes.  Administer 
60  the punishment for short 
OBEDIENCE WITHOUT ORDERS  18 
 
61  time please. 
62  (2) 
63 L: I don’t want any more I  
64  don’t want any more 
65  shocks so don’t push my 
66  hand down. 
67  (2) 
68 L: I don’t want any more. 
69  ((SHOCK)) 
70 L: OW! 
 
Following the learner’s withdrawal of consent on lines 5-9, there is no obvious attempt at 
resistance by the teacher.  Instead, we see a fairly typical exchange in which the experimenter 
responds to the learner in such a way as to minimize his resistance by suggesting that he 
simply needs to ‘relax’.  Despite the learner’s continued protestations, however, the teacher 
continues with the experiment by administering the next items in the memory test.  When the 
learner next makes a mistake, and in line with the procedure for this condition, the initial 
attempt at administering a shock does not work because the learner is not placing his hand 
upon the shock plate.  As is typical in this condition, the experimenter’s first attempts to 
resolve this situation are directed at the learner (lines 30-32; 37-39), and indeed the teacher 
himself appears to be telling the learner to put his hand on the plate (line 29) before he is cut 
off by the experimenter.  The teacher thus appears to be aligned with the experimenter in 
trying to elicit the learner’s co-operation, and is not showing any signs of resistance, even in 
the face of the learner’s persistent assertions that he will not put his hand on the shock plate 
(lines 33-36; 40-44).  At this point, the experimenter then turns to the teacher to ask him to 
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press the learner’s hand onto the plate.  The learner again protests, but the teacher’s only 
response is to ask the experimenter a minor procedural query (lines 57-58). 
 In straightforward terms, then, this extract features no attempt at resistance by the 
participant, and – according to recent attempts to specify what counts as an ‘order’ in the 
experiments – no orders from the experimenter directed at the participant.  It might be 
suggested that the participant is, in fact, obeying orders insofar as he is continuing the 
sequence of actions which the experimenter ordered him to undertake in the earlier stages of 
the experimental procedure (not shown in the transcript) in which the participant was given 
instructions on what he should do in the experiment (Hollander, 2015).  Equally, it could be 
said that as the participant is hearing the way in which the experimenter is ordering the 
learner to continue (e.g. lines 37-39: ‘you must depress the plate in order to receive the 
punishment’), he is in effect being given an insight into the response that awaits him should 
he try to defy the experimenter.  However, in both of these cases we are dealing with aspects 
of the situation that, while persuasive in themselves, are not orders that the participant 
continue in the sense defined above. 
 Subsequent to the exchanges presented in extract 1, the participant continued with the 
experimental procedure – with no attempt at resistance – all the way through to its 
completion following repeated administration of the 450-volt shock: 
 
Extract 2 
1 T: Brave, woman, soldier, 
2  dog, horse. 
3  (9) 
4 T: Four fifty volt. 
5  ((CLICK)) 
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6  ((CLICK)) 
7 L: OW! 
8  (3) 
9 T: That’s it what you wanna 
10  do? Start from the 
11  beginning? 
12 E: No continue using the last 
13  switch on the board please. 
14  (2) 
15 T: Brave woman.  White, 
16  cloud, horse, rock, house. 
17  (4) 
18 T: Four fifty volt. 
19 L: [No]= 
20  [((CLICK))] 
21 L: =AHHHH! 
22 T: I, press it down there that 
23  time. 
24 L: I don’t want any shocks I 
25  don’t wanna, I 
26  [don’t wanna ner-] 
27 E: [Teacher be sure] you hear 
28  the buzz on that shock 
29  please. 
30 T: Hm. 
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31 L: I- [I don’t want ’em.] 
32 E:     [Administer the 
33  punish]ment again. 
34 L: I don’t want any more 
35  shocks.  I want [out.] 
36 E:   [So] 
37  you can hear the buzz. 
38  ((SHOCK)) 
39 L: OWWW! 
40 T: Sad, face, music, clown, 
41  girl. 
42  (4) 
43 T: Four fifty volt. 
44  ((CLICK)) 
45  ((SHOCK)) 
46 L: OW! 
47 T: Short, sentence 
48 E: All right we’ll er, we’ll 
49  have to discontinue the 
50  experiment. 
 
Again, there is no overt attempt at resistance from the teacher,4 and as such he requires little 
in the way of direct orders from the experimenter to continue.  In this context, then, what are 
we to make of the experimenter’s utterances addressed at the participant?  On lines 12-13 he 
says ‘continue using the last switch on the board please’, and on lines 32-33 he says 
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‘Administer the punishment again … So you can hear the buzz’.  To meet Milgram’s 
definition of a command, an utterance needs to contain both ‘a definition of action and the 
imperative that the action be executed’ (Milgram, 1974, p. 147).  Each of these utterances 
clearly contains the first part – a definition of the action to be carried out:  the participant 
should continue using the last switch and administer the punishment again.  However, ‘the 
imperative that the action be executed’ is less clear.  The utterance on lines 12-13 even ends 
with the word ‘please’, which might be taken to indicate that this is a polite request, rather 
than an imperative to action.  Part of the confusion may lie in the term imperative, which has 
both a commonsense meaning concerned with urgency (e.g. it is imperative that this action 
be performed), and a technical grammatical meaning referring to verbs used to tell someone 
to do something (e.g. in the phrase Practice your clarinet, ‘practice’ is in the imperative 
mood).  Imperative verbs can, however, also be used to form grammatical requests (Please 
practice your clarinet).  Ultimately, the precise definition is secondary to the fact that, in 
context, the function of the imperative is the same – to compel someone to do something in 
such a way as to make it clear that they really ought to do it.  This suggests that the crucial 
feature of the imperative form is its directness, and in this respect the concept of directives, as 
outlined in linguistic philosophy (e.g. Searle, 1979) and conversation analysis (e.g. Goodwin, 
2006) might be useful.  Indeed, as noted above, Hollander (2015) has explored the ways in 
which Milgram’s experimental interactions could be framed in terms of directive-response 
sequences, identifying six distinct types of response to directives issued by the experimenter.  
However, as Craven and Potter (2010) note, Searle (1979) included requests, orders and 
commands (as well as various other actions) in his list of functions that directives can 
perform.  Craven and Potter (2010, p. 420, italics in original) themselves go on to make a 
distinction between requests, defined as actions ‘in which one participant asks another to do 
something’, and directives, ‘where one participant tells another to do something’ (see also 
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Curl & Drew, 2008; Hollander, 2015).  Again, by this distinction, the addition of ‘please’ 
appears to make an imperative verb part of a request rather than a directive. 
 These definitional issues are clearly important, and there are many good reasons why 
it may be useful to define specific terms (imperative, order/command, request, directive, etc.) 
in a grammatical sense.  However, what any definition misses is the context-specificity of 
function (Craven & Potter, 2010).  Conversation analysts have shown how a great deal of 
social business is conducted indirectly – for example, something that appears to be a 
statement, such as declaring that ‘it’s rather warm in here’, can be oriented to by recipients as 
a request to open a window.  In certain contexts – and the Milgram experiment may be a 
good example of just such a context – something that takes on the appearance of a request 
may function as an order.  As Milgram himself understood, the force of utterances such as 
‘Please continue’ lies not in its abstract grammatical form, but at least in part on a range of 
contextual contingencies such as who is saying it, where it is said, who is hearing it, and what 
previous actions have occurred.  Indeed, if we get bogged down in arguing over whether this 
– and other – formulations really were orders, requests, or something else, we risk paying too 
much attention to a debate about terminology amongst analysts, and insufficient attention to 
participants’ orientations to what they have heard.  In this respect, Milgram’s term ‘prods’ 
may be a much better description of the experimenter’s utterances than orders/commands, 
although even better would be the term ‘utterance’ itself.  The experimenter’s utterances are 
made in a context of authority – the experimenter himself is clearly in charge of the situation, 
although on occasion it is equally clear that he is himself only a subsidiary in a longer chain 
of authority; he is also (in most conditions) clearly attached to Yale University, with the 
implicit authority provided by such an affiliation.  In these circumstances, it doesn’t much 
matter whether the experimenter’s utterances are best glossed as requests, commands, or 
whatever.  Indeed, despite Miller’s (2009, p. 25) suggestion that the prods constitute ‘the 
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most explicit operationalization of authority’, the experimenter’s utterances themselves were 
arguably never the crucial vehicle for securing obedience.  It is not the prods that mark out 
Milgram’s experiments as being concerned with obedience, but rather the much more 
complex social and institutional context in which the prods were uttered.  The prods only had 
to be used when the unspoken requirements of the institution were not working.  In this 
respect, the prods were the last resort for securing obedience. 
 
Concluding remarks 
If direct orders are no longer to be seen as a defining feature of obedience, a widening 
of psychology’s conceptual toolkit may be needed to enrich its understanding of obedience as 
a process located in a complex socio-institutional context.  Indeed, even if we wish to retain a 
sense in which utterances that don’t meet Milgram’s (1974) or Reicher and Haslam’s (2011) 
definition of order/command (e.g. ‘please continue’) can in fact be understood in these terms, 
we are still likely to be confronted with situations in which people go along with the 
requirements of authority in the absence of even these somewhat milder commands.  Of 
particular use is making sense of this is Foucault’s (1979) argument concerning the way in 
which authority operates in modern societies.  Far from requiring the blunt exercising of 
disciplinary power, Foucault noted that the administrative demands of contemporary societies 
necessitate an altogether more subtle approach.  Authority is built into the fabric of social 
relations in such a way that it no longer needs to be exercised overtly, but rather so that 
people regulate themselves.  The classic example of this perspective is in Foucault’s use of 
Jeremy Bentham’s idea of the panopticon – a prison in which inmates might be monitored at 
any time without them being aware, and thereby regulate their own behaviour.  The inmates 
thus come to behave as if they were potentially being watched all the time.  Such ideas 
underlie much commentary on the nature of present-day ‘surveillance societies’ (Lyon, 
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2001).  As Lyon (2001, p. 115) argues, ‘The panopticon’s power does not reside simply in the 
(supposedly) ever-observant guard.  Rather, it is manifest in the way that the whole discourse 
and practice of the system bears down, constituting the subject as criminal and normalizing 
him or her into rehabilitation’.  In this respect, in Milgram’s experiment it is not simply the 
experimenter who constitutes the authority, but the wider system he inhabits, and of which he 
is a part.  If the subject in Foucault’s panopticon is constructed as criminal, then the subject in 
Milgram’s experiment is constructed as research participant, a figure who takes a specific 
place in the institutional arrangement of the scientific endeavour.  As Reicher, Haslam and 
Smith (2012; Haslam et al, 2014) have argued, the nature of the authority figure as a scientist 
is key to understanding how participants were kept shocking the learner.  In many respects, 
Milgram himself was well aware of these issues.  His experimental conditions included 
variations designed to manipulate the extent to which the institutional arrangements of the 
laboratory would be likely to compel participants to go on with the experiment.  His 
‘Bridgeport’ manipulation, for example, which was conducted in an office building with no 
apparent connection to Yale University, was aimed at assessing the impact of the wider 
system of which the experimenter is a part.  Moreover, such considerations are built into his 
discussion of the antecedent conditions for obedience (Milgram, 1974).  Even the title of 
Milgram’s book, Obedience to authority, implies a broader conceptual purview than the focus 
on orders.  Yet, as so often in psychology, it is in the operationalisation of concepts that the 
damage is done.  For the purpose of experimental design, Milgram returned to a definition of 
obedience in terms of following orders, and in construing his orders purely in terms of the 
experimenter’s verbal prods, Milgram ultimately missed the implications of these wider 
contextual arguments for how we might conceive of obedience itself. 
But where does this leave the role of argumentation in the Milgram experiments?  As 
noted above, several recent analyses have emphasised rhetoric and argumentation, and have 
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noted that this has been suppressed in standard treatments of the experiments (Gibson, 2013a, 
b, 2017; Hollander, 2015; Hollander & Maynard, 2016).  Moreover, levels of defiance in the 
experiments – which were very high in some conditions – have typically been downplayed in 
favour of an emphasis on overwhelming obedience.  When faced, however, with an example 
of a participant who did not resist, who did not argue back, and with an experimenter who did 
not need to resort to persuasive tactics, let alone direct orders, it appears that a perspective 
that seeks to highlight the role of rhetoric is presented with a challenge.  Nevertheless, if we 
understand rhetoric broadly, this challenge is less problematic that it might appear.  In his 
influential text on rhetoric and social psychology, Billig (1987) focussed on the overt use of 
rhetoric, and used this as a model for human thinking writ large.  However, in some of his 
subsequent work, Billig (1995, 1999b) drew attention to that which is left unsaid – that which 
need not be stated.  Indeed, Billig (1999b, p. 51) has framed this as a logical and necessary 
extension of his rhetorical perspective, suggesting that his earlier text ‘displays a theoretical 
one-sidedness’: 
The book, in its enthusiasm for argumentation, concentrates on the way that the 
rhetoric of argument opens up topics for thought.  It does not consider how the same 
rhetoric might provide the means for avoiding argument, or for repressing matters 
from the agenda.’ 
(Billig, 1999b, p. 51) 
In turning his attention to the absence of argument, Billig’s (1995) study of banal 
nationalism is of particular relevance for the present arguments.  Billig argued that, in its 
focus on periodic outbursts of ‘hot nationalism’, social science had neglected the more 
mundane and routine sense in which ‘the nation’ is reproduced on a daily basis as a taken-for-
granted backdrop to everyday life: 
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The flags hanging in the street, or attached to the lapels of politicians, carry no 
propositional message for the ordinary citizen to receive passively or consciously 
argue against. Yet, such symbols help to maintain the everyday world as belonging to 
the world of nation-states. 
Billig (2009, p. 349) 
This does not mean that such banal symbols can never be noticed and made the subject of 
explicit argumentation, but rather that for much of the time their power is precisely a function 
of the extent to which they remain unspecified – unremarked upon – in the background. 
 There is no reason to think that this banality applies only to nationalism (Reicher, 
Hopkins & Condor, 1997), and indeed we can apply the broad idea to the Milgram 
experiments by suggesting that it is in the banal institutional location of the experiments as 
part of the scientific endeavour, as well as in the physical configuration of the laboratory 
itself, that Milgram sought to render some arguments unnecessary.  Certainly, the 
experimenter could remind reluctant participants of the scientific nature of their participation 
(e.g. in prod 2, The experiment requires that you continue; Haslam et al, 2014), but equally 
this was not always needed.  It was clear to participants that – however unusual the task – it 
was part of a scientific enterprise accorded legitimacy by a number of features of the 
institutional set-up.  Equally, the experimenter never needed to make certain arguments 
concerning specific details of the procedure, such as that each successive shock was only a 
modest increase on the preceding one, because these were woven into the very fabric of the 
apparatus used in the experiment (Gilbert, 1981; Oppenheimer, 2015). 
 Thus, explicit resistance and argumentation is not needed in order to assert the 
centrality of rhetoric to the experiments.  For those participants who went all the way with 
minimal obvious attempts at defiance, we might suggest – in everyday terms – that they were 
already persuaded by the experimental setup, and needed no further attempts at persuasion to 
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keep them going.  Recent developments in rhetorical scholarship have argued for an 
understanding of rhetoric that moves it beyond human symbolic action such that ‘things’ 
themselves can be understood as having a rhetorical dimension (e.g. Barnett & Boyle, 2016; 
Davis & Ballif, 2014).  In this respect, rhetoric is not only to be found in the words, but in the 
walls.  Institutions and situations have a rhetorical structure that functions persuasively,  
before anyone opens their mouths.  In this context, direct orders are not necessary for 
obedience, all that is needed is for the system to do its job – to persuade people that a certain 
thing needs to be done, and that they are the ones that need to do it.  If an authority figure has 
to issue direct orders in such a situation, it is a sign that the institution – the very fabric of the 
context in which the action takes place – is failing to be sufficiently persuasive.  The direct 
order is thus a sign of the weakness of the authority – a sign that the institution itself is not 
sufficiently authoritative. 
In terms of wider processes of obedience, this appears to make intuitive sense.  The 
everyday use of the term ‘obedience’ and its derivatives clearly do not always presume direct 
orders.  When we speak, for example, of obeying the law we do not typically conceive of 
situations in which we are given commands by a police officer or similar authority figure.  
Instead, the term indexes normative understandings of what constitutes legally-sanctioned 
behaviours that have come to be regulated without the need for direct orders.  A new 
definition of obedience might thus be proposed as simply the submission to the requirements 
of an authority.  On the face of it this appears to be a modest amendment, but it removes the 
key element of the standard definition that has constrained psychological work on obedience 
for decades – the social act of the order or command.  If we limit ourselves to seeing 
obedience only where such direct attempts at the exercising of authority are apparent, we in 
fact limit ourselves to those situations where authority is at its weakest, at its most fragile.  
Clearly, it remains important to continue to study such contexts, but equally it is vital to 
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expand the purview of psychological research on obedience such that it takes in the much 
more diffuse – and arguably more pernicious – processes by which obedience is embedded in 
the fabric of everyday life. 
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Appendix:  Transcription conventions 
In the excerpts from the transcripts presented in the paper, speakers are identified as E 
(Experimenter), T (Teacher) and L (Learner).  Other transcription conventions are as follows:  
 
((inaudible)) Double parentheses indicate comments from the transcriber. 
(11) Numbers in parentheses indicate a timed silence, with the number indicating 
the amount in seconds. 
URGH! Capitals indicate utterances that are noticeably louder than the surrounding 
talk.  Exclamation marks indicate increased urgency in the delivery of the 
utterance. 
I can’t, I A comma indicates a pause of less than a second. 
I- A dash indicates a sharp cut-off of the preceding utterance. 
[continue] Brackets indicate overlapping talk. 
horse. A period indicates a ‘stopping’ intonation, rather than the end of a 
grammatical sentence per se. 
Why? A question mark indicates a questioning intonation, rather than a grammatical 
question per se. 
=answering Equals signs indicates ‘latching’ talk where the start of one line follows on 
immediately from the end of a previous line. 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1 Given the definitional issues to be discussed in this paper, it is important to note that I treat 
the terms order and command as synonyms. 
2 Haslam & Reicher (2018) have recently argued that their perspective should not, in any 
case, be understood as a ‘one-size-fits-all’ explanation. 
3 The ‘clicks’ referred to in the transcript excerpts represent either the sound produced when 
the learner’s response to one of the test items is displayed, or the sound produced when a 
participant attempts to administer a shock but fails to do so as a result of the learner not 
having placed his hand upon the shock plate.  The two sounds are both rendered as ‘click’ 
owing to their similarity. 
4 Notwithstanding the absence of overt resistance, the participant’s seemingly inadequate 
pressing of the shock level – as oriented to by the experimenter on lines 27-29 and 36-37 – 
might nevertheless be said to constitute a more subtle form of resistance. 
